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Agency Coordination in Consumer
Protection
CatherineM Sharkeyt

The federalization of consumer protection has created
thorny issues of agency coordination. Preemption doctrine
responds, at least in part, to the need for vertical coordination
when federal law and agencies enter an area of historic
significance to the states. But, in the field of consumer
protection, horizontal coordination-necessitated when Congress
charges different federal agencies with discrete and overlapping
jurisdiction-raises equally intractable problems. Or at least,
problems that, to date, have received considerably less attention
by courts and academics.
Murky doctrinal issues lurk within the topic of horizontal
agency coordination. When multiple federal agencies interpret
and enforce the same statute, should a single agency's
interpretation be accorded Chevron deference? Should it matter
whether it is in synch, or at odds, with its fellow agencies? The
case law is far from pellucid on these questions.
In an apparent effort to address this deference conundrum,
Congress, when creating the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (CFPB) in the Dodd-Frank Act, stipulated that the
CFPB should be given as much deference when interpreting or
enforcing "federal consumer financial laws" as it would be were
the CFPB the sole agency involved. But there are areas of
overlapping or shared regulatory responsibilities outside of
federal consumer financial laws. An especially significant
overlapping realm is the enforcement of unfair or deceptive acts
or practices by the CFPB, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC),
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the Officer of Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal
Reserve, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).
This Article explores two agency coordination strategies
that point in opposite directions. The first, a balkanization
strategy, attempts to overcome the overlapping agency
jurisdiction problem by urging agencies to create separate, nonoverlapping spheres of authority to thereby regain Chevron
deference due the agency that reigns supreme. We can expect
"agency self-help measures" that stake out respective turfs to
emerge from this strategy. The FDIC has made an early gesture
in this direction, stating that it will not try to maintain unfair or
deceptive acts or practices enforcement authority over the
entities for which the CFPB has such enforcement authority.
The balkanization approach--carving out discrete fiefdoms from
spheres of overlapping agency jurisdiction-finds considerable
judicial and academic support.
The second strategy, a model of judicial review as agency
coordinator, exploits (rather than constrains) overlapping
agency jurisdiction. Under this model, when faced with an
interpretation by an agency that operates in shared regulatory
space, courts would solicit input from the other relevant
agencies. And, to the extent that there is agreement among the
different agencies, Chevron deference would be especially
warranted (regardless of whether all of those agencies were
parties before the court), in sharp contrast to certain courts'
blanket stance that Chevron deference is inappropriate when
multiple agencies interpret the same statute.
To some extent, the provision in the Dodd-Frank Act that
gives veto power over the CFPB to the Financial Stability
Oversight Council (FSOC) operates as an agency-driven
oversight mechanism to harness multiple agencies' perspectives.
By two-thirds vote, FSOC can veto regulations that imperil the
safety and soundness of the banking system. In effect, then, a
CFPB regulation that withstands FSOC screening comes with
the imprimatur of multiple agencies with overlapping
jurisdiction. That said, it is a partial mechanism at best,
soliciting the Council members' views only on the dimension of
the safety and soundness of the banking system, not the
overlapping area of consumer protection.
The realm of consumer protection therefore contains both
coordination strategies to a degree, but much complexity
remains in this overlapping regulatory space. In light of the
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recent US Supreme Court decision in City of Arlington v.

Federal Communications Commission,'

the

balkanization

strategy may prove to be more effective in forthcoming agency
initiatives. Nevertheless, facilitating agency coordination may
be the better policy in certain shared spaces.
I. FEDERALIZATION OF CONSUMER PROTECTION
The Dodd-Frank Act reined in the federal preemptive
authority of the OCC and empowered state regulators in the
area of consumer financial protection, 2 while simultaneously
establishing an all-powerful new federal regulator, the CFPB.
Legislators and policy advocates focused a great deal of
attention on the vertical dimension of federal agency-state
relations: namely federal preemption. In sharp contrast,
legislators and policy advocates paid almost no attention to the
horizontal dimension of overlapping agency jurisdiction, even
though the CFPB expanded into spheres already occupied by the
FTC, the OCC, the Federal Reserve, and the FDIC. 3
Thus far, it appears that the CFPB has been in synch with
its co-regulators, dividing up turf and coordinating actions. But
what will happen when, as is inevitable, the CFPB and a coregulator do not see eye-to-eye? The Dodd-Frank Act does not
provide any guidance here. Indeed, the CFPB was created to
occupy shared regulatory space without much attention devoted
to the issue of overlapping agency jurisdiction. This Part
canvasses the existing academic literature on the advantages
and drawbacks of overlapping jurisdiction. It then outlines the
CFPB's regulatory framework and examines the joint actions it
has taken in its incipiency.

1 133 S Ct 1863 (2013).
See, for example, Catherine M. Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, 110 Mich L
Rev 521, 553-60 (2012). See also Jared Elosta, Dynamic Federalism and Consumer
FinancialProtection:How the Dodd-FrankAct Changes the PreemptionDebate, 89 NC L
Rev 1273, 1297-1303 (2011).
3 While all of the financial regulatory agencies discussed herein are "independent"
agencies, in that their leadership is subject only to good faith removal, Congress gave the
CFPB more independent features than it did others. See generally Kirti Datla and
Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (And Executive Agencies), 98
Cornell L Rev 769 (May 2013). Among other factors, the CFPB has a unitary
chairperson, subject only to good faith removal and receives its appropriations
independent of congressional oversight. See id at 787-88.
2
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Overlapping Agencies

To the consternation of administrative law scholars,4 the
issue of regulatory overlap and coordination has received
insufficient judicial attention to date. In a recent Supreme Court

decision,

City

of

Arlington

v

Federal Communications

Commission,5 Chief Justice Roberts made passing mention of
the issue in a sharp dissent (joined by Justices Kennedy and
Alito). Whereas the majority held that a court should apply
Chevron to an agency's determination of its own jurisdiction,6
the dissent insisted that "whether a particular agency
interpretation warrants Chevron deference turns on the court's
determination whether Congress has delegated to the agency
the authority to interpret the statutory ambiguity at issue."7 To
illustrate the need for this more particularized inquiry by the
courts-and the unanticipated complexities that would arise
from according Chevron deference to agency assertions of
jurisdiction-Chief Justice Roberts points out that "statutes that
parcel out authority to multiple agencies . . . 'may be the norm,
rather than an exception."' 8

4 See, for example, Jody Freeman and Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared
Regulatory Space, 125 Harv L Rev 1131, 1138-51 (2012); Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical
Regulation, 38 Conn L Rev 863, 868 (2006).
5 133 S Ct 1863 (2013).
6 Id at 1868 (holding that, with respect to Chevron deference, there is no difference
between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional agency interpretations). According to the
majority, a general conferral of rulemaking or adjudicative authority is sufficient for all
actions in that substantive field. Id at 1874 ("It suffices to decide this case that the
preconditions to deference under Chevron are satisfied because Congress has
unambiguously vested the FCC with general authority to administer the
Communications Act through rulemaking and adjudication and the agency
interpretation at issue was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.").
Id at 1881 (Roberts dissenting). Given that Congress did not specifically confer to
the FCC authority to interpret jurisdiction, the dissent would not accord Chevron
deference to agency jurisdictional determinations.
8 Id at 1883 (Roberts dissenting), quoting Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and
Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law, 2006 S Ct Rev 201, 208 (2006).
Moreover, the Chief Justice noted that "[t]he Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act ... authorizes rulemaking by at least eight different agencies."
City of Arlington, 133 S Ct at 1883, citing Curtis W. Copeland, Rulemaking
Requirements and Authorities in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, Congressional Research Service CRS-R41472 (Congressional Research
http://www.ballardspahr.com/-/media/Files/
at
2010), online
Service Nov 3,
GeneralContent/FinanciallnstitutionsReformTaskForce/CRS report rulemaking-require
ments and-authorities inDoddFrank_11-3-101.ashx (visited on June 27, 2013).
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Drawbacks of regulatory overlap.

Significant downsides of overlapping regulatory authority
include risks of inconsistency (both in terms of interpretation of
regulations and enforcement), uncertainty, and over-regulation.
J.B. Ruhl and James Salzman have highlighted the
problems of over-regulation. 9 They depict an administrative
state plagued by "regulatory accretion": namely, one suffering
from high societal costs imposed by excessive agency
regulations. 10 To Ruhl and Salzman, regulatory accretion is the
inevitable outcome of overlapping agencies.
William Buzbee sounds a wholly different alarm bell: the
regulatory void. Directly contrary to Ruhl and Salzman, Buzbee
predicts under-regulation as a result of overlapping agency
jurisdiction."
With many regulators sharing potential
jurisdiction over an area, Buzbee illustrates the scenario
whereby the concerns voiced by parties negatively impacted by
the lack of regulation will be diluted, as each turns to a different
regulator, none of which will have a sense of the sum of all of the
parts. 12 Nor will any one regulator have an incentive to deviate
from the status quo, given that no one regulator can be wholly
blamed for problems stemming from the absence of regulation. 13
Moreover, unilateral action on the part of one regulator would be
inefficient and potentially ineffective without action by the other
regulators. Buzbee terms this the "regulatory commons" effect,
which will tend to stymie efforts for comprehensive regulation in
fields where multiple agencies occupy the same regulatory
sphere.14
2.

Advantages of regulatory overlap.

In recent years, some academics have focused on the
potential advantages of overlapping agency jurisdiction-in the
form of greater expertise, more complete coverage, and
9 See generally J.B. Ruhi and James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The
Problem of Regulatory Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 Georgetown L J 757
(2003).
1o Id at 800-19.
n William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of
Regulatory Gaps, 89 Iowa L Rev 1, 5-6 (2003).
12 See id at 22-33.
13 Id at 31.
14 Id at 22-23.
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coordinated action-and have analyzed tools with an eye toward
harnessing these benefits.
For example, Robert Ahdieh identifies four primary benefits
of regulatory overlap: (1) addressing the complexity of regulated
subjects; (2) overcoming regulatory inertia; (3) encouraging
innovation in regulatory design; and (4) facilitating integration
across jurisdictional lines. 1 5 Ahdieh also suggests that the critics
of regulatory overlap have oversimplified the discussion because
agencies can overlap in numerous ways and to varying
degrees.1 6
Similarly, Todd Aagaard challenges the traditional claim
that regulatory overlap leads to inefficient, duplicative, and
conflicting regulation.1 7 He argues in particular that regulatory
overlap can often be an efficient way to ensure that there are no
gaps between various agencies' statutory boundaries.18 He goes
so far as to suggest that Congress deliberately creates overlap
more frequently than is acknowledged and that certain areas of
law are more prone to regulation by overlapping agencies.1 9
Aagaard acknowledges that such overlap certainly has the
potential to create inefficiencies. 20 But he proposes that the
benefits of overlap-including reliability and policy innovationcan best be supported by overlap that is intragovernmental, that
is between agencies with similar perspectives (for example, the
Environmental Protection Agency and Occupational Safety and
Health Administration both protect health and safety), and that
defines clear priorities of action between or among the
overlapping agencies so that each one knows when to act. 2 1
Lawrence Baxter argues that regulatory overlap makes
capture-a term used for the idea that regulated entities can
exert controlling influence on the agency that regulates themmore difficult, particularly in the area of bank regulation, both

Ahdieh, 38 Conn L Rev at 882-83 (cited in note 4).
Id at 898 ("[I]ntersystemic regulation encompasses more than any single pattern
of regulatory engagement across jurisdictional lines. Rather, an array of interactionsdistinct in the degree of dependence and the valence of the relationship, among other
factors-is encompassed within the universe of intersystemic regulation.").
" See Todd S. Aagaard, Regulatory Overlap, Overlapping Legal Fields, and
Statutory Discontinuities,29 Va Envir L J 237, 286-300 (2011).
1s Id at 292-95.
19 Id at 285.
20 Id at 286.
21 Aagaard, 29 Va Envir L J at 300-01 (cited in note 17).
1s

16
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because there is no single regulator and also because banks
occupy a "quasi-public role." 22 He suggests that, while a bipolar
relationship exists in certain areas of regulation, pitting
government action against the interests of the private sector,
the idea of "private interest" in the banking sector is less
diametrically opposed to government interest. 23 Baxter argues
that an analysis of agency overlap in the banking sector must
account for the fact that working relationships between
regulators and regulated entities are beneficial for both
parties. 24 He proposes that this balance can best be maintained
through (1) adequate regulatory capacity; (2) meaningful
transparency on the part of agencies; (3) meaningful access by
stakeholders; and (4) external checks on regulators. 25
B.

CFPB and Shared Enforcement

A core area of regulatory overlap in the realm of consumer
protection is enforcement against unfair or deceptive acts or
practices (UDAP). The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is
charged with enforcing against UDAP under § 5 of the FTC
Act. 26 Banks,
however, are exempt from such FTC
2
7
enforcement. The FDIC, OCC, Federal Reserve, and the CFPB
are charged with UDAP enforcement authority over their
respective regulated banks. 28

22 Lawrence G. Baxter, CaptureNuances in FinancialRegulation, 47 Wake Forest L
Rev 537, 539 (2012).
23 Id at 551 ("The financial industry, perhaps unlike any other
... possesses some
fundamentally distinct characteristics that make its level of influence both inevitable
and, to a certain degree, essential.").
24
Id.

Id at 560-63.
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 USC § 45(a)(1) (2012). The FTC
Act has a
three-part test for an "unfair" act or practice: "[1] causes or is likely to cause substantial
injury to consumers [2] which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and
[3] not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition." 15 USC
§ 45(n). A 1983 FTC policy statement notes that the FTC will find "deception" if there is:
"[1] a representation, omission or practice that is likely to mislead [2] the consumer
acting reasonably in the circumstances, [3] to the consumer's detriment." Federal Trade
Commission,
Policy Statement on Deception (Oct 14,
1983),
online
at
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-decept.htm (visited Sept 15, 2013).
27
15 USC § 45(a)(2).
28 See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Compliance Manual § VII-1.1 (Dec
2012), online at http: //www.fdic.gov/regulations/compliance/manual/pdflVII-1.1.pdf
(visited Sept 15, 2013).
25
26
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Regulatory framework.

As a centerpiece of the 2010 Dodd-Frank regulatory
overhaul, Congress created the CFPB. 29 The CFPB is charged
with rooting out abuses in consumer banking services, such as
sub-prime mortgages and payday loans. Prior to the
establishment of the CFPB, the FDIC, the OCC, and the Federal
Reserve were responsible for banks' safety and soundness as
well as consumer protection-goals that were often in conflict. 30
Congress gave the CFPB broad oversight over federal
consumer financial laws. 3 1 The CFPB has primary enforcement
authority with respect to the federal consumer financial laws
over covered persons-defined as insured depository institutions
with total assets of more than $10 billion. 32 The agency has
authority to prevent "unfair, deceptive, or abusive" acts and
practices (UDAAP) with respect to these covered entities. 33 The
CFPB adopts the FTC's definitions of "unfair" and "deceptive." 34
It has wider jurisdiction than the FTC, however, to consider
"abusive" acts or practices, defined by the Dodd-Frank Act as

29 See Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act, Pub L No 111-203, 124 Stat 1376 (2010),
codified at 12 USC §§ 5481 et seq.
30 See, for example, Adam J. Levtin, The Consumer FinancialProtection Agency,
Pew Financial Reform Project, online at http://www.pewtrusts.orgluploadedFiles/
wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/FinancialReform/Pew-Levitan-CFPA.pdf (visited Sept 15,
2013) ("For federal banking regulators, there is a conflict between their primary
mission-bank safety-and-soundness-and the consumer protection mission.. .. Placing
the two missions together in a single agency ensures that one will trump the other, and
historically consumer protection has not won out . . . .").
31 Section 1022 of the Dodd-Frank Act empowers the CFPB to "administer, enforce,
and otherwise implement the provisions of Federal consumer financial law." 12 USC
§ 5512(a). Subsection (b) empowers the CFPB to "prescribe rules and issue orders and
guidance" in order to "carry out the purposes and objectives of the Federal consumer
financial laws, and to prevent evasions thereof." 12 USC § 5512(b). Subsection (b)(4)(A)
gives the CFPB "exclusive authority to prescribe rules" under the Federal consumer
financial laws. 12 USC § 5512(b)(4)(A). The definition of "federal consumer financial law"
in § 1002(14) explicitly excludes the Federal Trade Commission Act. See 12 USC
§ 5481(14).
32 12 USC § 5515(a)-(b).
12 USC § 5531(a).
3
The Dodd-Frank Act defines "unfair" with the same language as the FTC Act. See
12 USC § 5531(d). The CFPB, in a 2011 Enforcement Manual, incorporates the FTC's
definition for "deceptive" acts or practices. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,
Supervision and Examination Handbook 2011 5 n 10 (Oct 1, 2011), online at
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/fl201210_cfpb-supervision-and-examination-manualv2.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2013) (explaining that CFPB examiners "should be informed by
the FTC's standard for deception"). See note 26.
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acts or practices that take advantage of a consumer's lack of
sophistication or understanding. 35
The CFPB and the FTC share regulatory enforcement over
non-depository consumer financial product providers.36 The
CFPB must consult with the FTC in defining respective
jurisdictions. The statute thus contemplates that the two
agencies can agree on a division of enforcement authority. 37
The FDIC, the OCC, and the Federal Reserve Board enforce
the FTC's prohibition on unfair or deceptive acts or practices (§ 5
of the FTC Act) against the financial institutions they

3

The Dodd-Frank Act defines an "abusive" act or practice as
one that:
(1) materially interferes with the ability of a consumer to understand a term or
condition of a consumer financial product or service; or
(2) takes unreasonable advantage of
(A) a lack of understanding on the part of the consumer of the material risks,
costs, or conditions of the product or service;
(B) the inability of the consumer to protect the interests of the consumer in
selecting or using a consumer financial product or service; or
(C) the reasonable reliance by the consumer on a covered person to act in the
interests of the consumer.

12 USC § 5531(d). See also Carey Alexander, Note, Abusive: Dodd-Frank Section 1031
and the Continuing Struggle to Protect Consumers *11-20 (St John's University School of
Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series No 10-193, Mar 2011), online at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1719600
(visited Sept 15, 2013)
(examining the need for CFPB authority over "abusive" acts and practices due to the
shortcomings of merely preventing unfair or deceptive acts and practices); Jean
Braucher, Form and Substance in Consumer Financial Protection, 7 Brooklyn J Corp,
Fin & Comm L, *PC (forthcoming 2014), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id=2126859 (visited Sept 15, 2013) (concluding that the CFPB is
focusing on products that exploit consumer lack of understanding).
36 The CFPB has no authority to enforce the FTC Act.
12 USC § 5481(14)
(specifying that the term "Federal consumer financial law" does not include the Federal
Trade Commission Act). "Covered persons" under Dodd-Frank are defined as "(A) any
person that engages in offering or providing a consumer financial product or service; and
(B) any affiliate or a person described in subparagraph (a) if such affiliate acts as a
service provider to such person." 12 USC § 5481(6). The set of entities included in this
definition of covered persons is substantially broader than the set of bank entities
excluded from direct FTC enforcement authority in § 5 of the FTC Act. See 15 USC
§ 45(a). Thus, a substantial source of overlap is the set of covered persons under DoddFrank who can also face direct FTC enforcement.
3
See 12 USC § 5514(a)(1); 12 USC § 5514(a)(2). Although the CFPB has finalized
two rulemakings defining its jurisdictional scope under this provision of Dodd-Frank, it
has yet to do so with respect to its overlap with the FTC. See generally Defining Larger
Participants of the Consumer Debt Collection Market, 77 Fed Reg 65775 (Oct 31, 2012);
Defining Larger Participants of the Consumer Reporting Market, 77 Fed Reg 42873
(July 20, 2012).
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regulate.3 8 Like the CFPB, these federal regulators adopt the
FTC's definitions of "unfair" and "deceptive." 39 The regulators'
consumer protection jurisdiction, apart from § 5, depends on the
size of the depository institution and whether or not the CFPB
decides to regulate. The FDIC has authority to enforce the
CFPB's UDAAP rules with respect to smaller institutions (in
other words, depository institutions with less than $10 billion in
assets).40 According to the FDIC's website (as of October 2013),
only 108 of 6,903 FDIC-insured institutions have total assets
greater than $10 billion, leaving the vast majority of these
banking institutions under the FDIC's UDAAP enforcement
authority. 41
2.

Joint agency actions.

CFPB's first three adjudications were the product of
enforcement actions that entailed coordination with other
financial regulatory agencies. To date, only one of its
rulemakings has been jointly undertaken.
a) Joint enforcement actions. In its first enforcement
action, CFPB took on Capital One, one of the nation's largest

3
See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Payment Processor Relationships
Revised Guidance *2 n 2 (Jan 31, 2012), online at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/
financial/2012/fill2003.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2013) ("Under Section 8 of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act, the FDIC has authority to enforce the prohibitions against Unfair
or Deceptive Acts or Practices."). Before Dodd-Frank, the FDIC had explicit authority to
enforce the FTC Act over its regulated banks. 15 USC § 57(f). Curiously, Dodd-Frank
repealed this explicit enforcement authority but preserved the exemption for banks from
FTC enforcement authority. 15 USC § 45(a)(1). Although one could read this legislative
action as contemplating a complete removal of UDAP enforcement authority from the
FDIC, the FDIC has affirmed its authority to prevent unfair or deceptive acts and
practices generally under § 8 of the FDI Act in a 2012 Financial Institution Letter. See
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Payment Processor Guidance at *2 n 2 (cited in
note 38).
3 See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Unfair or Deceptive Acts of Practices
by State-Chartered Banks, Financial Institution Letter (Mar 11, 2004), online at
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2004/fil2604.html (visited Sept 15, 2013). The
FDIC Enforcement Manual also expressly references the FTC Act's definitions. Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, Compliance Manual §§ VII-1.1-2 (Dec 2012), online at
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/compliance/manual/pdflVII-1.1.pdf
(visited Sept 15,
2013).
40 Section 1026 of Dodd-Frank states that for depository covered persons with $10
billion or less in deposits, the prudential regulators have primary enforcement authority
with respect to federal consumer financial law. See 12 USC § 5516.
41 See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Find an Institution,
online at
http://www2.fdic.gov/IDASP/main.asp?formname=inst (visited Oct 8, 2013) (allowing
users to search FDIC-insured banking institutions by total assets).
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banks. 42 A vendor working for the bank pressured and deceived
cardholders into buying products presented as a way to protect
against identity theft and hardships like unemployment or
disability. 43 CFPB reached a settlement with Capital One,
whereby Capital One agreed to reimburse $140 million to more
than two million customers, in addition to paying $35 million in
fines. 44 As part of a coordinated action, the OCC required
Capital One to reimburse customers "harmed by unfair billing
practices" over a ten-year span. 45
At the time of the settlement with Capital One in July 2012,
CFPB Director Richard Cordray made clear that policing the
financial industry for deceptive practices would be a mainstay of
CFPB's operations: "We know these deceptive marketing tactics
for credit card add-on products are not unique to a single
institution. We expect announcements about other institutions
as our ongoing work continues to unfold."46 Less clear were the
respective roles, going forward, to be played by the CFPB and
the OCC (and other banking regulators) in enforcing against
unfair, deceptive, or abusive practices. 47
In the Matter of Capital One Bank (Agreement Containing Consent Order) *1
(CFPB 2012), online at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201207_cfpb consent order
0001.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2013).
3 Id at *5-6.
44 See id at *14--21.
4 In the Matter of Capital One Bank *7 (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
2012), online at http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2012/2012-110b.pdf
(visited Sept 15, 2013) (fining Capital One $35 million dollars in civil penalties).
4 Ben Protess and Jessica Silver-Greenberg, DEALBOOK; In Its First Action,
Consumer Bureau Takes Aim at Capital One, NY Times (July 19, 2012), online at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=940DE3DE1F3FF93AA25754COA9649D
8B63&ref=capitalonefinancialcorporation&pagewanted=2 (visited Sept 15, 2013).
47 Nor is it clear the extent to which the banking regulators will-or shouldcoordinate with state attorneys general, who are likewise active in this area. As reported
by Protess and Silver-Greenberg, the West Virginia AG reached a $13.5 million
settlement with Capital One over payment protection plans. Id. The Mississippi AG sued
Capital One for enrolling customers without consent; the Hawaii AG has sued several
other banks, including Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, and HSBC, for the allegedly
deceptive sale of add-on products; and the Minnesota AG has sued Discover over duping
customers into buying products. Id.
As Abbe Gluck has perceptively noted, scholars' "recent focus on concurrent
administrative jurisdiction has mostly failed to acknowledge the states." Abbe Gluck,
IntrastatutoryFederalism and Statutory Interpretation:State Implementation of Federal
Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 Yale L J 534, 557-58 (2011), citing Freeman and
Rossi, 125 Harv L Rev at 1135 (cited in note 4); Gersen, 2006 S Ct Rev at 203 (cited in
note 8). Gluck's pioneering work attempts to fill this gap. See, for example, Gluck, 121
Yale L J at 542-44 (cited in note 47); Abbe R. Gluck and Lisa Schultz Bressman,
Statutory Interpretationfrom the Inside-An Empirical Study of CongressionalDrafting,
42
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In a later enforcement action, the CFPB pursued American
Express for violations of § 5 of the FTC Act and Title X of DoddFrank (covering "unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or
practices"). 48 American Express engaged in allegedly deceptive
marketing practices, whereby customers were misled into
believing that they would receive $300 plus bonus points if they
signed up for the "Blue Sky" credit card; however, customers
who met the qualifications did not receive the $300 bonus
payment. 49 The FDIC (along with the Utah Department of
Financial Institutions) conducted an examination, which the
CFPB joined.50 The CFPB, the OCC, and the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System (as well as the Utah Department
of Financial Institutions) took separate actions against various
entities related to American Express. In a comprehensive
settlement, American Express agreed to a consent order, an
order for restitution, and orders to pay $85 million to more than
250,000 consumers, in addition to $27 million in civil monetary
fines.51
The CFPB's third administrative enforcement action was its
joint action with the FDIC against Discover Bank's deceptive
marketing of certain credit card products. 52 Telemarketers
allegedly misled consumers (by
working for Discover
misrepresentations and omissions) about whether they were
purchasing a product during calls. 5 3 This was compounded by
the fact that Discover did not need to ask for credit card
information because it could directly bill its members. 54 Discover
agreed to a consent order and stipulation based on violations of
§ 5 of the FTC Act in addition to the sections of the Dodd-Frank
Delegation, and the Canons: PartI, 65 Stan L Rev 901, 1006-11 (2013).
4
In the Matter of American Express Centurion Bank (CFPB and FDIC Joint
Consent Order, Restitution Order, and Order to Pay Civil Penalty 2012) *1, online at
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/2012-CFPB-0002-American-Express-CenturionConsent-Order.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2013).
4
Id at *3.
5 Id at *2.
51 Id at *21-32. See also Tara Arick, American Express Bank Pays $112 Million to
Settle Deceptive Practices Claims, Martindale Blog (Martindale-Hubbell Oct 1, 2012),
online at http://blog/martindale.comlamerican-express-bank-pays-112-million-to-settledeceptive-practices-claims (visited Sept 15, 2013).
52 In the Matter of Discover Bank (Joint Consent Order, Order for Restitution,
and
Order to Pay Civil Money Penalty 2012), online at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/
f/201209_cfpb_consent order_0005.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2013).
Id.
5
4 Id.
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Act governing UDAAP 55 The bank was ordered to pay $14
million in civil fines in addition to providing at least $200
million in restitution to eligible customers.5 6
b) Joint rulemaking. The CFPB has participated in one
joint rulemaking in conjunction with the Federal Reserve, the
FDIC, and the OCC (as well as the Federal Housing Finance
Agency and the National Credit Union Administration).67 The
rule, issued under the Truth in Lending Act, sets out more
stringent conditions for obtaining appraisals when a consumer
takes out a high-priced (subprime) mortgage loan.5 8 Oddly, the
CFPB's final rule does not mention that the rule was jointly
promulgated with the other banking agencies.
II. BALKANIZATION APPROACH
The predominant thrust of the judicial and scholarly
response to issues posed by regulatory overlap has been in the
direction of what I term the "balkanization approach"-that is,
that agency jurisdiction should be construed to yield clear
boundaries. This Part first examines judicial treatment of
overlapping agency jurisdiction in general and then describes
responses by Congress and the relevant agencies in the specific
context of consumer protection enforcement by multiple
agencies.

5

Id.
In the Matter of Discover Bank (Joint Consent Order, Order for Restitution, and
Order to Pay Civil Money Penalty 2012) at *28 (cited in note 52).
s? On its own, the CFPB has issued several final rules pursuant to Dodd-Frank, as
well as rules amending the regulations implementing the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
(Regulation B), Electronic Fund Transfer Act (Regulation E), Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act (Regulation X), and Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z).
58 See Environmental
Protection Agency, National Emission Standards for
Hazardous Air Pollutants for Major Sources: Industrial, Commercial, and Institutional
Boilers and Process Heaters, 78 Fed Reg 7215, 7217 (2013), codified at 12 CFR § 1222.
The rule allows a creditor to offer a consumer a high-priced mortgage loan only if the
creditor obtains a written appraisal of the property that is performed by a licensed
appraiser who physically visits the property and inspects the interior. Id. The rule also
provides for certain disclosures (including a free copy of the appraisal) to be made
available to such consumers. Id. For a more detailed summary of the rule, see Consumer
56

Financial Protection Bureau, Summary of final rule on providing appraisals and
valuations (Jan 18, 2013), online at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/fl201301cfpb-ecoaappraisals-rule summary.pdf. (visited Sept 15, 2013).

342
A.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL

FORUM

[2013

Judicial Deference to Overlapping Agencies

Jacob Gersen has aptly described "an exclusive jurisdiction
canon" by which, in the face of statutes implemented by multiple
federal agencies, "courts go to great length either to conclude
that no agency was given law-interpreting authority .. . or to
conclude that only one agency was given law-interpreting
authority."5 9 Gersen highlights as a prime example the US
Supreme Court's decision in Gonzales v Oregon.60 In that case,
the Attorney General of the United States had interpreted the
Controlled Substances Act to preclude doctors' prescription of
drugs to facilitate assisted suicide.6 1 The Controlled Substances
Act gave interpretive authority to the Department of Health and
Human Services in addition to the Department of Justice. 62 The
Supreme Court thus faced the issue of what level of deference to
accord an agency's interpretation of a statute that gives
authority to multiple agencies. 63 The Court held that deference
should be given to the agency that has the relevant expertise,
which the Court decided was the Secretary of Health and
Human Services, not the Attorney General: "The deference here
is tempered by the Attorney General's lack of expertise in this
area and the apparent absence of any consultation with anyone
outside the Department of Justice who might aid in a reasoned
judgment." 64 This holding suggests that relevant expertise
should be a factor in assessing deference in a shared space,6 5
contrary to the traditional view.
1.

Traditional view: no deference.

The traditional view in the DC Circuit Court of Appealsthe "specialized administrative law court" in the US 66-holds

59

*
61

62

Gersen, 2006 S Ct Rev at 222 (cited in note 8).
546 US 243 (2006).
Id at 249.
Id at 259, citing 21 USC § 821.

Gonzales, 546 US at 261-62.
Id at 269.
6
See Gersen, 2006 S Ct Rev at 225 (cited in note 8) ("[O]ne reason the majority did
not defer to the Attorney General's interpretation was that the Attorney General lacked
the relevant expertise ... . When one agency has greater expertise than another agency,
it is not ludicrous to suggest that courts should defer to the more expert one.").
6
See generally Hon. Douglas H. Ginsburg, Remarks Upon Receiving the Lifetime
Service Award of the Georgetown Federalist Society Chapter, 10 Georgetown J L & Pub
63

64
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that agencies interpreting statutes applied by other agencies
should receive no deference.6 7 The court provided such a
categorical pronouncement in Rapaport v United States
Department of Treasury, Office of Thrift Supervision.68 In
Rapaport, the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) had sued to
enforce an agreement signed by the majority shareholder of a
failed financial institution in which he had pledged his personal
wealth as a guaranty for the institution's capital.6 9 OTS had
argued that, by failing to honor the agreement, the shareholder
was unjustly enriched within the meaning of 12 USC
§ 1818(b)(6)(A), and that the court should defer to OTS'
construction of § 1818 because it was the agency tasked with
enforcing it against Rapaport. 70 The court stated: "[W]e owe no
[Chevron] deference to the OTS' interpretation of § 1818 because
that agency shares responsibility for the administration of the
statute with at least three other agencies." 7 '
This categorical no deference position, moreover, has been
taken to heart by the lower federal courts. As summarized by
one federal district court judge within the DC Circuit: "[I]n this
Circuit, where multiple agencies are charged with administering
a statute, a single agency's interpretation is generally not
entitled to Chevron deference; instead the court must review the
agency's interpretation de novo." 72 There are myriad additional
examples of cases interpreting a diverse range of statutes that

Pol 1 (2012).
67 Other circuits have not taken such a categorical approach. The Second Circuit
has taken a middle approach, between the extreme poles of no deference and full
Chevron deference. See 1185 Ave of Americas Associates v Resolution Trust Corp, 22 F3d
494, 497 (2d Cir 1994). As the court explained, "Where Congress has entrusted more
than one federal agency with the administration of a statute a reviewing court does not
owe as much deference as it might otherwise give if the interpretation were made by a
single agency similarly entrusted with powers of interpretation." Id. However, the court's
statement here is dicta, given that the court interprets the statute at issue with no
reference to the agency's interpretation.
6 59 F3d 212 (DC Cir 1995).
69 Id at 213-14.
70 Id at
216.
" Id. In Rapaport, the court interpreted what was essentially dicta from an earlier
DC Circuit opinion. See Wachtel v Office of Thrift Supervision, 982 F2d 581, 585 (DC Cir
1993). In Wachtel, the court disparaged the agency's statutory interpretation as "barely
intelligible." Id. The court went on to comment (in dicta) that, even if OTS were the only
agency interpreting the statutory provision, the court would not give Chevron deference
to OTS' interpretation because the statutory language is unambiguous and the agency's
interpretation is "capricious." Id.
72 New Life Evangelistic Center, Inc v Sebelius, 753 F Supp 2d 103, 122 (DDC 2010).
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follow this basic position. For example, in considering the
Secretary of the Army's interpretation of a statute, a federal
district court accorded no deference to the Secretary's position in
light of the fact that the statute applied to all branches of the
military, not solely the army. 73 In similar fashion, the DC
Circuit withheld deference to the OCC's interpretation of the
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act in
favor of de novo review on account of the fact that "multiple
agencies besides the Comptroller administer the act."7 4
A categorical no deference position in the face of overlapping
agency jurisdiction, however, makes little sense from either a
jurisprudential or policy perspective. Such an approach is not
supported by either of the two dominant theories of judicial
deference: expertise or democratic accountability. 75 Nor is it in
synch with what drafters of congressional legislation typically
intend.7 6 The no deference position makes sense for a limited
category of cases, namely with respect to certain statutes (such
as the Administrative Procedure Act, Freedom of Information
Act, and National Environmental Policy Act) that apply across
7
See Lipsman v Secretary of the Army, 257 F Supp 2d 3, 8 (DDC 2003) ("When an
agency shares responsibility for the administration of a statute with other agencies, the
court owes the agency's statutory interpretation no Chevron deference.").
74 Grant Thornton LLP v Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 514 F3d 1328,
1331 (DC Cir 2008). See also Proffitt v Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,200 F3d
855, 860 (DC Cir 2000) ("When a statute is administered by more than one agency, a
particular agency's interpretation is not entitled to Chevron deference.").
7
Consider Gersen, 2006 S Ct Rev at 220 (cited in note 8). Gersen outlines a
"competing agents" framework, whereby competition (as opposed to coordination) among
agencies is key to better regulations. Id. Gersen posits that the exclusive jurisdiction
canon may be an attempt to recreate Congressional intent by assuming Congress
delegated to the most informed agency. Id. This canon therefore wrongly views expertise
as static and exogenous when it can actually change over time. See id. Agencies will
enter jurisdictional gaps and fight over overlaps by investing in expertise to capture and
preserve jurisdiction. Gersen, 2006 S Ct Rev at 213-15. Jurisdictional overlap therefore
acts as a stick and underlap as a carrot toward development of agency expertise.
The D.C. Circuit was off-base when it concluded-as a general matter-that in
shared regulatory space "there is thus not the same basis for deference predicated on
expertise as we found in Chevron." Proffitt, 200 F3d at 860, quoting Salleh v Christopher,
85 F3d 689, 692 (DC Cir 1996).
76 In an empirical study based upon a survey of 137 congressional staffers (drawn
from both political parties, both chambers of Congress, and numerous committees), Abbe
Gluck and Lisa Schultz Bressman report that "[iun the context of multiple federal
agencies, only two of our 137 respondents (1%) indicated that overlapping regulatory
duties indicate a congressional intent to delegate to neither agency." Gluck and
Bressman, 65 Stan L Rev at 1006-07 (cited in note 47). To the contrary, "[a]lmost 25%
of ... respondents [stated] that overlapping regulatory duties signal intent to delegate to
both agencies, and roughly the same number (23%) indicated that only one agency is
intended to have interpretive authority." Id at 1007.
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the board to all agencies but are not administered by any
agency. But outside of that limited context, withholding
deference simply on account of shared interpretive authority is
counterproductive.
2.

More nuanced view: carve-up.

A more nuanced view-albeit still within the balkanization
paradigm-emerges from the DC Circuit case law. Judge
Rogers, in a concurrence in Rapaport, took the position that "it
appears too facile to conclude that deference is inappropriate
simply because more than one agency is involved in
administering a statute."7 7 Judge Rogers further argued that
while consideration should be given to the fact that multiple
agencies administer a statute, "deference may nonetheless be
appropriate where only expert banking agencies administer the
statute and there is no disagreement among them about their
respective responsibilities or the agency position under
review." 7 8 The same reasoning should apply to non-banking
expert agencies; the "no disagreement about respective
responsibilities" clause is an angle of attack that some courts
and agencies could use to circumvent no-deference where
Congress has left the boundaries ambiguous.
Courts have designed a strategy to preserve deference so
long as the overlapping area of authority can be carved up.
Namely, where multiple agencies have overlapping jurisdiction,
but each agency's interpretation only applies to a distinct subset
of the regulated population, the court may defer to the agency's
interpretation.7 9 Statutes in which expert enforcement agencies
have in essence mutually exclusive authority over separate sets
of regulated persons lend themselves to this type of analysis.
For example, the Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity
Act (AMTPA) is applied by three different banking agenciesOTS, OCC, and National Credit Union Administration-but
each agency regulates a distinct subset of the covered

7

Rapaport, 59 F3d at 221 (Rogers concurring).

7 Id.
7 See, for example, Trans Union LLC v Federal Trade Commission, 295 F3d 42, 50
(DC Cir 2002) (according Chevron deference to the FTC's interpretation of a statute
administered by several agencies where the agencies had non-overlapping jurisdiction);
National Home Equity Mortgage Assn v Office of Thrift Supervision, 271 F Supp 2d 264,
273 (DDC 2003).
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population.8 0 OTS made a determination that two of the
regulations in A1VITPA did not preempt state law and that state
housing creditors must therefore comply with states' regulations
governing these items.8 OTS' amended rule applied strictly to
its particular regulated entities. 82 Thus when the rule was

challenged in National Home Equity Mortgage Association v
Office of Thrift Supervision,83 the federal district court held that
OTS' interpretation was entitled to deference. 84
Courts have thus recognized that if a statute delegates
enforcement authority over distinct sub-groups of the regulated
population in order to take advantage of different agencies'
expertise, deference may still be appropriate. In such cases, it
does not seem at odds with congressional intent, and the
prudential bases for deference are preserved.8 5 National Home
Equity distinguished its holding from past instances of no
deference in the DC Circuit by explaining that particular
expertise was present here.8 6
The carve-up approach is consistent with Chevron
jurisprudence where agency expertise is maintained and
Congress did not unambiguously desire jurisdictional overlap to
continue. As a matter of policy, it may be preferable to the no
deference standard because it overcomes the accountability
problem inherent in overlapping jurisdiction and vests
interpretive authority with an expert agency rather than a
court.87

so National Home Equity Mortgage, 271 F Supp 2d at 274 (noting that each agency
"is limited to identify regulations that apply only to their respective institutions").
"

Id at 268.

8'

Id at 267-68.

271 F Supp 2d 262 (DDC 2003).
8 Id at 273.
* The classic prudential bases for Chevron deference are expertise and
accountability. Where intent is ambiguous, courts may at times presume that Congress
would prefer deference to non-deference simply because it makes for more effective
policy. See Daniel Lovejoy, The Ambiguous Basis for Chevron Deference: Multiple-Agency
Statutes, 88 Va L Rev 879, 887 (2002).
8 271 F Supp 2d at 274 ("In those cases, however, none of the agencies had
particular expertise in handling the substance of the statutes. As a result, the policy
basis underlying Chevron deference-namely, deference to the agency's particular
expertise-had not been satisfied.").
8
See also Gersen, 2006 S Ct Rev at 212-13 (cited in note 8) (arguing that the
assignment of jurisdiction can be used to create incentives for agencies to invest in the
development of expertise while simultaneously overcoming regulatory drift).
8
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Congressional Response

Congress seems to appreciate that agencies may not receive
deference when interpreting statutes that are also administered
by other agencies. Yet Congress has not legislated to eliminate
overlap.88 To the contrary, Congress has continued to create
overlapping regulatory schemes.8 9
Presumably in an attempt to strengthen the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), Congress provided that:
The deference that a court affords to the Bureau with
respect to a determination by the Bureau regarding the
meaning or interpretation of any provision of a Federal
consumer financial law shall be applied as if the Bureau
were the only agency authorized to apply, enforce,
interpret, or administer the provisions of such Federal
consumer financial law.9 0
With this little-noticed provision,9 1 Congress tried to shore up
the deference to be accorded CFPB when it acted in shared
regulatory space.
But Congress' deference provision only covers CFPB's
interpretations of "[fjederal consumer financial law[s]." The
Dodd-Frank Act, however, excludes the FTC Act from the
definition of "[flederal consumer financial law." 92 Thus, in
situations where the CFPB overlaps with the FTC, the FDIC,
and the OCC in enforcing against unfair or deceptive acts or
practices, the deference conundrum persists.

88 Buzbee, for example, has urged Congress to act to eliminate overlap in light of
concern about under-regulation due to "regulatory commons." Buzbee, 89 Iowa L Rev at
22-23 (cited in note 11).
89 Freeman and Rossi suggest that overlapping delegations may be committee
power grabs, attempts to insulate policy from presidential influence, or policy
compromises. Freeman and Rossi, 125 Harv L Rev at 1138-46 (cited in note 4).
Alternatively, they suggest that such delegations may be to harness greater agency
expertise or promote insulation from politics. Id.
9
12 USC § 5512(b)(4)(B).
91 Todd Zywicki mentions the deference provision as one of several structural
defects of the CFPB, an entity that Zywicki charges is unique in the history of American
bureaucracy for the degree to which it has vast, vaguely defined power coupled with
relatively scant accountability. See Todd J. Zywicki, The Consumer FinancialProtection
Bureau: Savior or Menace?, 81 Geo Wash L Rev 856, 893-99 (2013). Zywicki
characterizes the deference provision as symptomatic of a lack of judicial control over the
agency. Id at 893.
92 12 USC § 5481(14).
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In addition to addressing regulatory overlap in the
consumer regulatory space, Congress also acknowledged the
overlap between the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). The
Dodd-Frank Act requires that the SEC and the CFTC consult
with each other before beginning any rulemaking regarding
swaps or those trading in them, though Congress stopped short
of calling for joint rulemaking on the issue. 93
C.

Agency Response

The FDIC has stated that it will not try to maintain UDAP
enforcement authority over the entities for which the CFPB has
such enforcement authority. 94 With this "self-help" measure, the
FDIC voluntarily cedes regulatory and interpretive authority to
the CFPB, thereby preserving the two agencies' entitlement to
deference in their respective regulatory spheres. 95 But this
solution raises questions: Should agencies have the power to
regain deference by unilaterally creating separate, nonoverlapping spheres of authority? Should their voluntary carveup agreements pass legal muster?
Some courts have given weight to agreements between
agencies regarding allocation of jurisdiction, while others have
disregarded such agreements and determined jurisdiction based
on statutory authority alone.9 6 The US Supreme Court's decision
See Dodd-Frank Act § 712(a), 124 Stat at 1641, codified at 15 USC § 8302(a).
Section 1025 of Dodd-Frank grants the CFPB primary enforcement authority
with respect to federal consumer financial laws to covered persons that are insured
depository institutions with total assets of more than $10 billion. See 12 USC § 5515.
This section also establishes that regulators, who would otherwise have authority to
enforce the federal consumer financial laws, shall have "backup enforcement authority"
with respect to those institutions and the federal consumer financial laws. 12 USC
§ 5515(c)(3).
Because the FDIC has affirmed its enforcement authority with respect to the FTC
Act's UDAP provisions, as opposed to the CFPB's UDAAP provisions, this section should
not affect the FDIC's status as primary regulator of the banks it regulates. If the FDIC
were to take this position, then these banks (covered persons-that is, depository
institutions with greater than $10 billion in deposits) would face FDIC enforcement of
FTC UDAP rules as well as CFPB enforcement of UDAAP rules. The FDIC, however,
seems to have voluntarily ceded this authority.
9
This voluntary carve-up only applies to the CFPB's overlap with the FDIC.
9 See Jason Marisam, Duplicative Delegations,63 Admin L Rev 181, 237-38 (2011)
(collecting cases). For an example of a court's giving weight to such agency agreements,
see Public Citizen v Foreman, 631 F2d 969, 975 (DC Cir 1980) (finding an agreement
between the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the FDA to be significant). For an
example of a court's refusing to credit such an agreement, see Chicago Board of Trade v
1

94
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in City of Arlington supports deference when an agency engages
in voluntary carve-up, at least with respect to ambiguous
jurisdictional boundaries. If, as City of Arlington holds, agencies
are afforded Chevron deference for an interpretation of their
jurisdiction, then there should be no reason why an agency
agreement on splitting jurisdiction should not be treated in a
similar fashion as a general matter.9 7
A further caveat to the prospect of voluntary carve-up as a
solution is that, while these agencies have declared an intention
not to have multiple agencies regulating the same entity, they
all explicitly
reference the other agencies' statutory
98
interpretations.
Shared interpretations create a consistent
regulatory regime but lean closer to coordination than
balkanization. If deference requires exclusive jurisdictional
spheres, shared interpretations may be seen as overlap.
III. COORDINATION APPROACH

While balkanization may be the dominant response to
regulatory overlap, an equally-if not more promising-strategy
points in the opposite direction, toward coordination.
A.

Congressional Mandates for Agency Interaction
1.

Consultation.

Dodd-Frank § 1022 requires the CFPB to consult with "the
appropriate prudential regulators or other Federal agencies
prior to proposing a rule and during the comment process
regarding consistency with prudential, market, or systemic

Securities Exchange Commission, 677 F2d 1137, 1142 n 8 (7th Cir 1982) (refusing to
credit an agreement between the SEC and the CFTC on dividing jurisdiction because
"the two agencies cannot thereby enlarge or relinquish their statutory jurisdictions").
9
One significant point with respect to statutory ambiguity at Chevron "Step One"
warrants mention. The majority in City of Arlington framed its holding as an application
of the general rule that agencies are always limited by their statutory authority and any
interpretation within that authority that relates to a statutory ambiguity warrants
deference. City of Arlington, 133 S Ct at 1868-69. If a court, however, determined that
that statutory boundary between two agencies' jurisdiction were clear, then an agency
carve-up agreement to the contrary would not warrant deference.
98 See, for example, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Compliance Manual at
*§ VII-1.2-3 (cited in note 39) (citing the Federal Trade Commission's definitions of
"unfair" and "deceptive"); Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Handbook at *5 (cited
in note 34) (explaining that CFPB examiners "should be informed by the FTC's standard
for deception").

350

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2013

objectives administered by such agencies." 99 Indeed, it is
common for Congress to require interagency consultation prior
to decisionmaking where an action will impact a shared
regulatory space.1 00
This congressional mandate thereby forces some interaction
among the agencies, at least with respect to balancing safety
and soundness concerns with consumer protection. The
consultation mandate by no means assures any degree of
coordination. Nonetheless, having been directed to consult on
matters of safety and soundness of the banking system, agencies
might develop de facto coordination of their respective consumer
protection policies as well.
2.

Financial Stability Oversight Council veto.

Congress gave limited veto power over the CFPB rules to a
multi-agency Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC).10 1
Section 1023 of Dodd-Frank lays out a framework for the FSOC
review, whereby, under a narrow set of conditions, final CFPB
rules can be vetoed and set aside. 10 2 Any member agency of the
FSOC can petition to set aside a final CFPB rule (or any
provision thereof). 103 By two-thirds majority vote, the FSOC can
set aside a regulation on the ground that it threatens to imperil
the safety or soundness of the banking system. 10 4 This FSOC

9

12 USC § 5512(b)(2)(B).

See Freeman and Rossi, 125 Harv L Rev at 1157 (cited in note 4). As Freeman
and Rossi elaborate, consultation may be most beneficial where new information or
perspectives can help to overcome an insular agency culture or decisionmaking process.
Id. It may also help where the potential for mission conflict is high, expertise is diffuse,
and the risk of silo decisionmaking is present. Consultation typically involves a lead
agency as the main decisionmaker, which maintains accountability but nevertheless
considers the priorities and expertise of other agencies with related missions.
101 FSOC member agencies include: the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System; the Commodity Futures Trading Commission; the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation; the Federal Housing Finance Agency; the National Credit Union
Administration; the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency; the Securities and
Exchange Commission; the Treasury Department; and the Consumer Financial
0

Protection Bureau. See Financial Stability Oversight Council: About FSOC (U.S.
Department of the Treasury 2013), online at http: //www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/
about/Pages/default.aspx (visited Sept 15, 2013).
102 See 12 USC § 5513.
103 The petition must be published in the Federal Register.
12 USC § 5513(a)(2).
1o4
12 USC § 5513(a) (proclaiming that the FSOC can veto a regulation or provision
that "would put the safety and soundness of the United States banking system or the
stability of the financial system of the United States at risk"). After a petition is filed,
the regulation will become final unless the FSOC acts within either forty-five or ninety
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veto power recognizes the importance of balancing safety and
soundness goals against consumer protection goals, even when
those functions have been assigned to separate agencies.
More generally, the multi-agency Council has the makings
of a model for agency coordination. 105 But its capacity to serve as
a prompter of coordinated agency action is inherently limited.
The FSOC's only statutory role is to allow the other agencies'
safety and soundness missions to trump the CFPB's consumer
protection mission if enough of the agencies agree. The veto
threat could incentivize inter-agency communication and
consistent policy even without being used, but it is a blunt
instrument that the FSOC might find too unwieldy for
facilitating coordination.
B.

Agency Collaboration Initiatives

To the extent the scholarly literature has urged a
coordination approach, it has focused primarily on agencyinitiated collaboration. 106 Jody Freeman and Jim Rossi argue
that agency overlap has the potential for tremendous efficiency
gains, if the agencies can properly coordinate their actions.10 7
They propose two agency collaboration initiatives-interagency
agreements and joint policymaking-to harness the potential of
multiple agencies acting in a "shared regulatory space." 0 8
Interagency agreements primarily take the form of Memoranda
of Understanding (MOUs).109 To Freeman and Rossi, the relative

days (depending upon whether the Council agrees to a preliminary stay). 12 USC
§§ 5513(b)-(c).
105 Rachel Barkow, however, warns that the FSOC veto employs the type of
"involvement by other agencies that can undermine the CFPB's own structural
protections." Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through
InstitutionalDesign, 89 Tex L Rev 15, 75 (2010).
106
For example, Freeman and Rossi cite the FIC's and DOJ's coordination on
merger guidelines, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)-National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) joint rule on greenhouse gas emissions, and the
Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of Energy and National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency to collaborate on research as examples of agencyinitiated collaboration. Freeman and Rossi, 125 Harv L Rev at 1183-85 (cited in note 4).
107
See id at 1181-89.
'o" Id at 1157.
'09 Generally unenforceable and unreviewable in court, MOUs are negotiated by
agencies to further some statutory objective. MOUs can be used for a variety of purposes:
delineating jurisdiction, setting up procedures for information sharing, collaborating on
a common mission, coordinating reviews (such as with licensing), and agreeing on
substantive policy. Id at 1161.
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informality, ease of enactment, and adaptability of these nonbinding
agreements
make
them
potentially
valuable
coordination tools.1 10 Joint policymaking marks a step up in
terms of agency coordination. Akin to interagency regulatory
negotiation, agencies can incorporate each other's rules, follow
model rules, interlock their rules, or adopt a single text (joint
rulemaking). Joint policymaking encourages agencies to move
beyond their traditional arm's length relationships to pool
resources and collaborate on major tasks.n
In a similar vein, Robert Ahdieh focuses on voluntary and
"dialogic" agency interactions-agencies want to learn from and
share ideas with agencies with a similar mission. 112 Dialogic
regulation is most effective when regulatory entities with
jurisdictional overlap and a degree of dependence on one another
engage in recurrent interaction, experimentation, learning, and
growth. 113 Dependence fosters cooperation as each agency needs
the other to achieve what it hopes to accomplish.
Each of these agency collaboration initiatives, however, can
break down. As Freeman and Rossi note, where conflict is high,
such agreements are of little use without centralized supervision
by another branch. 114 Freeman and Rossi suggest that the
president would do well to attempt to harness the potential of
coordinated agencies, though they warn that presidential
attempts to do so may be met with congressional resistance.1 15
They argue that the President is in a unique position to spur
coordination given his heightened accountability for agency
policy and his burden to ensure that the laws are faithfully
executed.1 16 The caveat is that Congress may have fragmented
authority specifically to insulate the agencies from presidential
control, and the President may face legal barriers in compelling
independent agencies to coordinate sans congressional support.

110 Freeman and Rossi, 125 Harv L Rev at 1192 (cited in note 4).
11 Freeman and Rossi cite a joint rulemaking in 2009 by the EPA and NHTSA as an
example of agency staffs working closely together on promulgating a single federal
standard for automobile greenhouse gas emissions. Id at 1169. By collaborating on a
single regulatory scheme, the agencies were able to harmonize their conflicting
regulatory approaches and benefit from one another's expertise. Id.
112 See generally Ahdieh, 38 Conn L Rev 863
(cited in note 4).
113 Id at 914.
114
115
116

Freeman and Rossi, 125 Harv L Rev at 1173 (cited in note 4).
Id at 1173-81.
Id at 1174.
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Freeman and Rossi are far less sanguine about the potential for
judicial review to prompt agency coordination. 117
C.

Judicial Review as Agency Coordinator

The model of judicial review as agency coordinator exploits
(rather than constrains) overlapping agency jurisdiction. Under
this model, when faced with an interpretation by an agency that
operates in shared regulatory space, courts would solicit input
from the other relevant agencies. And, to the extent that there is
agreement among the different agencies, Chevron deference is
especially warranted (regardless of whether all of those agencies
are parties before the court).
1.

Deference to multiple agencies' shared interpretation.

Where multiple agencies share regulatory space-but all
agree on the interpretation of a statute-it makes little sense for
courts to withhold deference from that shared interpretation
when put forth by a single agency. Judge Rogers embraced this
view in her Rapaport concurrence: "[D]eference may nonetheless
be appropriate where only expert banking agencies administer
one statute and there is no disagreement among them about
their respective responsibilities or the agency position under
review.""" Jacob Gersen picks up a similar thread in resisting
the "exclusive jurisdiction canon" when he advocates that with
respect to "joint-enforcement statutes . . . courts should give

deference to both agencies, at least absent an affirmative conflict
between the two." 119
Hints of this approach can be found in existing case law.
The Skidmore deference doctrine has given courts latitude to
consider multiple agency interpretations in the pursuit of
consistency. 120 For example, in Bragdon v Abbott, 121 in deciding
Freeman and Rossi suggest that requiring agencies to work together may run
of
the prohibition on judicially imposed procedures. Id at 1208, citing Vermont
afoul
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc, 435 US 519
(1978). Further, while opposed to the exclusive jurisdiction canon, they argue that
interagency consensus should not be afforded greater deference by courts. Freeman and
Rossi, 125 Harv L Rev at 1203-09 (cited in note 4).
11
Rapaport, 59 F3d at 221 (Rogers concurring).
119 Gersen, 2006 S Ct Rev at 227 (cited in note 8).
120
See Skidmore v Swift & Co, 323 US 134 (1944). Skidmore deference applies to
agency interpretive rules that do not have the "force and effect of law" necessary to
garner Chevron deference. Id. Courts may defer to agency judgments nonetheless based
117
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whether HIV infection constituted a disability, the US Supreme
Court looked to the "consistent course of agency interpretation
before and after enactment of the [Americans with Disabilities
Act]."122 While the Court did not decide whether any agency's
interpretation was entitled to Chevron deference, 123 it stated
that "[iut is enough to observe that the well-reasoned views of
the agencies implementing a statute 'constitute a body of
experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants
may properly resort for guidance."' 124 Likewise, in Collins v

National Transportation Safety Board,125 the DC

Circuit

indicated that the level of Skidmore deference would diminish in
light of conflicting positions espoused by agencies operating in
shared regulatory space: "If the three enforcement agencies were
found to have conflicting (though individually very reasonable)
interpretations, the varied positions' 'power to persuade' would
sharply fall."126
2.

Soliciting absent agencies' views.

According deference to the interpretation shared by
multiple agencies is one way to prompt or encourage
coordination or collaboration amongst agencies operating in
shared regulatory space. It is worth considering, in addition, a
process by which courts can solicit agency views in order to
promote further coordination and to overcome the problem that
some courts will only defer to agencies if all of the agencies that
have jurisdiction in that particular area have explicitly stated
their position.
Consider in this regard, the position taken by the federal

district court in New Life Evangelistic Center, Inc v Sebelius:
[I]f all agencies charged with administering a particular
statute possessed the same interpretation, then deference
upon "the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it
power to persuade, if lacking power to control." Id at 140.
121
524 US 624 (1998).
Id at 642.
"[Wle need not pause to inquire whether this causes us to withhold deference to
agency interpretations under [Chevron]." Id.
122
123

124

Id, quoting Skidmore, 323 US at 139-40.

12
126

351 F3d 1246 (DC Cir 2003).
Id at 1253-54.
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would be appropriate, but because one of the three
agencies charged with administering the [Act] was not
before the court, "the existence of an alternative agency
interpretation is at least theoretically possible." 1 2 7
The Ninth Circuit took a contrary approach in Navajo
Nation v Department of Health and Human Services,128 holding
that when all agencies agree, or when only one has yet weighed
in on the issue, the mere "theoretical possibility" of conflicting
agency interpretation is not "sufficient grounds to jettison
Chevron deference."129
A better approach would be for courts to solicit views from
agencies with overlapping jurisdiction. The DC Circuit's staunch
"no deference" position has impeded development along these
lines. Proffitt v FDIC130 is illustrative. In that case, the DC
Circuit rejected the FDIC's determination that 28 USC § 2462,
which imposes a five-year statute of limitations on "an action. . .
for the enforcement of any . ..

penalty" did not apply to the

FDIC's removal of a bank director (pursuant to section 8(e), 12
USC § 818(e), of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act) because the
sanction is remedial, not punitive. 131 At the outset of its
analysis, the court reiterated its traditional view that "[w]hen a
statute is administered by more than one agency, a particular
agency's interpretation is not entitled to Chevron deference." 132
More specifically, the court explained that "[b]ecause a section
8(e) proceeding can be initiated by more than one agency,
namely, the FDIC, the OCC, the Federal Reserve and the Office
of Thrift Supervision, we do not extend Chevron deference to
[the FDIC's] interpretation of the statute." 133
Reading the DC Circuit's decision in Proffitt, one might be
with
the impression that the FDIC simply put forth its own
left
singular view of the applicability of the statute of limitations to

New Life Evangelistic Center, 753 F Supp 2d at 123.
285 F3d 864 (9th Cir 2002), affd on other grounds, 325 F3d 1133 (9th Cir 2003)
(en banc).
129 Id at 874-75.
130 200 F3d 855 (DC Cir 2000).
127

128

Id at 861.
Id, citing Bowen v American HospitalAssn, 476 US 610, 643 n 30 (1986).
13s Proffitt, 200 F3d at 863 n 7, citing Wachtel v Office of Thrift Supervision, 982 F2d
581, 585 (DC Cir 1993); Bowen, 476 US at 643 n 30.
131
132
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underlying

Because the case involves an important issue of first
impression before the FDIC . . .which affected all of the
banking agencies, the Executive Secretary . . . issued an

Order reopening the record to permit further briefing on
the issue including an invitation to the other banking
agencies-the Office of Thrift Supervision ("OTS"), the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC"), and
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
("Federal Reserve")-to submit amicus briefs if they so
desired.134
Indeed, the FDIC Board's determination that the statute of
limitations was inapplicable to removal actions was buttressed
by the same interpretation put forth by the Federal Reserve and
the OTS in their amicus briefs.135 But this solicitation of agency
views did not merit any acknowledgement by the DC Circuit.
Although balkanization benefits from clearer lines of
accountability, agency coordination may benefit from greater
expertise, greater innovation, and greater consistency among
agencies in a shared space. There does not appear to be a
satisfying policy rationale for denying deference where all
relevant expert agencies agree.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Where agency missions are in conflict, coordination may be
contrary to congressional intent and counterproductive; in such
cases, balkanization may be the best approach. For example, the
CFPB looks out for consumer safety, which can place it at odds
with sister agencies more concerned with bank soundness. Yet
when agencies coordinate in a shared space, they can more
easily produce consistent policy and share expertise, such as
when consumer protection agencies interlock regulations and
reference one another's interpretations.
The balkanization and coordination approaches point in
opposite directions, but both appear to be better policy than a

'4
Decision and Order, In the Matter of Billy Proffitt, FDIC-96-105e, *1 (issued Oct
6, 1998) (available on Westlaw at 1998 WL 850087).
'3
Id at *7.
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rigid no deference standard. Courts have accepted the carve-up
coordination strategy in the past, and may accept it more readily
as the jurisprudence after City of Arlington develops with regard
to agency interpretations of jurisdiction.
Judicial review as agency coordinator, while a more novel
approach, could be a promising strategy in certain cases.
Although deference is a presumption about congressional intent,
it is ultimately a judicially created default rule.136 Courts could
easily, therefore, adopt a clear default rule in overlapping
delegations to better facilitate agency coordination and exploit
shared spaces to reach better policy outcomes, such as soliciting
absent agency views in determining deference.
Ultimately, a modified Chevron will need to develop to
address the unique problems and potential benefits inherent in
shared regulatory spaces. The realm of consumer protection is
ripe to advance this heretofore underdeveloped area of
regulatory policy.

136

Lovejoy, 88 Va L Rev 879 at 906 (cited in note 85).

